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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Contempt of 
LaRAE PETERSON. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
9948 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, LaRae Peterson, appeals from a find-
ing of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
State of Utah, that she was in contempt of court in re-
fusing to answer certain questions while a witness for the 
prosecution in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sinclair. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After finding the appellant, LaRae Peterson, guilty of 
contempt for refusing to answer a question propounded by 
the prosecution in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sin-
clair, the court imposed a penalty sentencing her to serve 
five days in jail. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the finding of contempt should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, LaRae Peterson, was called as a witness 
by the State in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sinclair, 
in which case the latter person was charged with the first 
degree murder of Donald Foster.1 The killing took place on 
January 4, 1962 at the Susan Kay Apartments in Salt Lake 
City.2 LaRae Peterson, the appellant in the instant case, 
was in the automobile in which she and the deceased had 
just alighted from the automobile when he was shot and 
killed. 3 The deceased and the appellant, LaRae Peterson, 
had intended to get married, although the deceased was 
still married at the time of his death. 4 It was the State's 
contention that the motive for the killing in the instant 
case was one of homosexual jealousy. The State introduced 
into evidence a letter from Jean Sinclair to LaRae Peterson, 
which stated :5 
"Dearest One : I love you with all of me. I 
didn't mean it for a minute (sorry that I ever met 
you). You know that I didn't live until you loved 
me. I love, want and need you and your love. What-
ever I must do I will do. Please be patient and help 
me, Honey. Your love is all that has kept me going. 
I promise never to mention the men in your life 
tSee Record in State VS. Sinclair, 9971. 
21bid. 
BJbid., R. 449. 
•Ibid., R. 421. 
15Jbid., R. 442. 
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8 
again. All I want is to have you and Cheryl Ann 
happy. Please let me. All my love always. 2:45 
a.m." 
The evidence further disclosed that Jean Sinclair had made 
gifts of various items to LaRae Peterson and had allowed 
her to use space in Sinclair's nursing home so that Miss 
Peterson could operate a beauty parlor, and Jean Sinclair 
did so without charge. 6 Various other close relationships 
between appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, were 
admitted. 7 During the course of the direct examination by 
the prosecution, the following question was put by the pros-
ecutor:8 
41Q. I'll ask you if you or Jean have ever com-
mitted any Lesbian acts with each other? 
"MR. HATCH: Objected to as ambiguous. 
"MR. MITSUNAGA: Also may the record show 
Counsel does invoke the privilege pursuant to 70 
Utah Code in reference to. Mr. Banks' question. 
"MR. BANKS: I'll lay a foundation first of. 
all for Mr. Hatch's objection. 
''THE COURT: You may. 
"Q. (By Mr. Banks) Do you know what 'Les-
bian' is? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"MR. BANKS: I'll reput the question then at 
this time and allow whatever objections are going 
to be made. 
6lbid., R. 414-419. 
'Ibid .• R. 412-499. 
81bid .• R. 427. 
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4 
"MR. HATCH: Will you hold your answer un-
til We object. 
"THE WITNESS: Yes. 
"MR. BANKS: Will you re-read the last ques-
tion prior to the objection. 
" (Record read.) 
"MR. HATCH : Permission to voir dire. 
HTHE COURT: You may. 
"VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
"BY MR. HATCH: 
"Q. Do you know what Lesbian acts are? 
"A. I imagine so. 
"Q. What are they? 
"A. Well, I don't know how I would explain 
that. 
"Q. If you know what they are, you can de-
fine them, I suppose, can't you? 
"A. Well, I imagine that's when two women 
more less- oh, have sexual relations with one an-
other. Is that-
"Q. Is it possible for two women to have sex-
ual relations with one another, to your knowledge? 
"A. I wouldn't know, sir. 
"Q. What in your way of thinking is a Les-
bian? 
"A. Just what I just said, sir. 
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"Q. In other words, a person that has homo-
sexual acts with another woman? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. But you don't. know whether two women 
can have homosexual acts, is that correct? 
"A. Well, I imagine they can. I don't know. 
"Q. What would be a homosexual act between 
two women, in your mind? 
"MR. MITSUNAGA: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object to this whole line of questioning, Mr. 
Hatch's testimony, if she's competent to testify this 
would have to come within her own personal knowl-
edge. On that basis, we'd invoke the privilege pur-
suant to the Utah Code. 
''THE COURT: Are you citing a statute to the 
Court? 
"MR. MITSUN AGA: That's right. I'm citing 
Statute of The Code, your Honor, 78-24-9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
"THE COURT: You'll have to refresh the 
Court's memory as to that statute. 
"MR. MITSUNAGA: The statute states that 
the witness need not answer a question that has a 
tendency to subject the witness to punishment for 
a felony nor need to give any answer which will 
have a tendency to degrade unless it is a very fact 
in issue or to a fact from which a fact in issue 
would be presumed." 
There was additional argument by counsel in the presence 
of the court, after which a recess was taken until the next 
morning, at which time the following occurred : 
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"MR. BANKS: I believe at the close of the last 
session we had an unanswered question. Would the 
Reporter please read the last question. 
"(Reporter reading) Well, I'll put it this way 
then. Have you had any homosexual acts with Jean 
or she with you. 
"MR. HATCH : May the record in addition to 
my objection to ambiguity show a further objection 
on the basis of immateriality and the basis of irrele-
vancy. 
"THE COURT: The record may so show. The 
objection will be denied. 
"MR. MITSUNAGA: And I'm going to advise 
my client at this time to refuse to answer the ques-
tions on the grounds that it tends to incriminate 
and also degrade. 
"MR. BANKS: We'll request the Court to com-
pel an answer. 
'iTHE COURT: Of course, the privilege, if it's 
going to be claimed, must be claimed by the defen-
dant - or by the witness, excuse me. 
"THE WITNESS : Well, I refuse to answer on 
the grounds that it would tend to incriminate and 
degrade me. 
"MR. BANKS : I'd request at this time that the 
Court compel the witness to answer. 
"THE COURT: Yes. Mrs. Peterson, the Court 
feels that under these circumstances the way this 
question is asked, and in connection with the legal 
ramifications involved, that this privilege is not 
claimable by you at this time under these circum-
stances. And, therefore, the Court orders you to 
answer the question. 
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"MR. HATCH : May the record note an excep-
tion on behalf of the Defendant Sinclair to the 
Court's ruling. 
"THE COURT: The record may so show. 
"MR. MITSUNAGA: May the record further 
show that the attorney for Miss Peterson further 
notes an exception to the court's ruling. 
"THE COURT: The record may so show. 
"The Court further advises you, Mrs. Peterson, 
that your refusal to answer this question upon the 
direct order of this Court would also place you in 
contempt of this Court. 
"THE WITNESS : Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT : You are again instructed to 
answer this question. Will you repeat the question, 
Mr. Reporter. 
''(Question reread.) 
"THE COURT: You are again ordered to ans-
swer, Mrs. Peterson. 
"THE WITNESS: I still refuse. 
"THE COURT: I didn't hear you. 
uTHE WITNESS: I still refuse to answer. 
"THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Banks." 
Based upon the witness's refusal to answer, the court, at 
a subsequent time, and out of the presence of the jury, 
found the appellant guilty of contempt and sentenced her 
to five days in jail. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT, LARAE PETERSON WAS 
PROPERLY HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT 
SINCE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND 
REAL DANGER THAT HER ANSWER, TO 
THE QUESTION PROPOUNDED BY THE 
PROSECUTION, WOULD TEND TO SUBJECT 
HER TO PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME. 
The appellant contends in her brief that the trial court 
erred in punishing her for contempt for failure to answer 
the question of whether she had engaged in any homosexual 
acts with the defendant, Jean Sinclair. The appellant, in 
her brief, makes the contention that the answer to the 
question of whether or not she had engaged in any homo-
sexual acts would tend to incriminate her by subjecting 
her to punishment for the crime of sodomy. An analysis 
of the record, it is submitted, discloses that there is little 
likelihood that such would in fact be the case. In response 
to a question from the prosecution as to how she would 
define a lesbian act, she stated, "Well I imagine that's 
when two women more or less - oh, have sexual relations 
with one another" (R. 427, No. 9971). She then further 
testified to the question of whether or not, to her knowl-
edge, it would be possible for two women to have sexual 
relations, "I wouldn't know, sir" (R. Ibid.). She then tes-
tified: 
"Q. What in your way of thinking is a Les-
bian? 
"A. Just what I just said, sir. 
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"Q. In other words, a person that has homo-
sexual acts with another woman? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. But you don't know whether two women 
can have homosexual acts, is that correct? 
"A. Well, I imagine they can. I don't know." 
The appellant's testimony, therefore, was that she had 
no knowledge of whether or not sexual acts could be com-
mitted between two women. As a consequence, it appears 
dear that appellant could not have committed any sexual 
acts with the defendant, Jean Sinclair, or she would have 
had knowledge of the capability of the commission of such 
acts. Consequently, when she refused to testify on the 
grounds that it might tend to incriminate her to the ques-
tion of whether or not she had engaged in homosexual acts, 
it was obvious that there was no real or substantial possi-
bility that the answer to that question could tend to con-
vict her of any crime since she had previously denied hav-
mg any knowledge as to the possibility of whether or not 
such acts could be performed between women. 
It is submitted that on the basis of the record, as it 
was then before the trial court, that there was no violation 
of law such as would vitiate the contempt finding. The 
appellant cites in her brief the Fifth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 12 of the State 
Constitution, and 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, to sustain the 
claim that the answer requested by the prosecution was 
privileged. An analysis of these provisions and the law 
applicable to the privilege against self-incrimination clear-
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ly demonstrates that the appellant may not avail herself 
of their protection. This, when coupled with the facts of 
record, which obviously indicate that the appellant had 
no reason to fear that the answer to the posed question 
would tend. to incriminate her, results in a conclusion that 
the trial court was correct in its finding. 
Federal Constitution: It is, of course, a well known 
fact that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * * ." 
However, this provision is not applicable to the instant 
case. The Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination privilege, 
has been held by the United States Supreme Court not to 
be applicable, through the Fourteenth Amendment, against 
the states. Consequently, since the instant prosecution was 
in the. state courts, the Fifth Amendment protection was 
not available to the appellant. 
In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that the privilege 
against self-incrimination provided for in the Fifth Amend-
ment was not applicable against the states. The court re-
lied upon its previous decision in Barron v. Baltimore, 7 
Peters 243, 8 L. Ed 672 ( 1833) . The decision in the Twin-
ing case was also in accord with the dicta in the case of 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606 (1895), where Justice 
Brown stated : 
"* * * It is true that the Constitution does 
not operate upon a witness testifying in the state 
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courts, since we have held that the first eight 
amendments are limitations only upon the powers 
of Congress and the Federal courts, and are not 
applicable to the several States, except so far as 
the Fourteenth Amendment may have made them 
applicable. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Fox 
v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 
84; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; Pres-
ser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252." 
Most recently the Supreme Court has continued to follow 
the decision of the Twining case, and in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 322 U. S. 46 (1947), the Supreme Court of the 
United States refused to abandon the Twning rule, stating: 
"* * * the Bill of Rights, when adopted, 
was for the protection of the individual against the 
federal government and its provisions were inap-
plicable to similar actions done by the states. Bar-
ron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Feldman v. United 
States, 322 U. S. 487, 490. With the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was suggested that 
the dual citizenship recognized by its first sentence 
secured for citizens federal protection for their ele-
mental privileges and immunities of state citizen-
ship. The Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36) de-
cided, contrary to the suggestion, that these rights, 
as privileges and immunities of state citzenship, re-
mained under the sole protection of the state gov-
ernments. This Court, without the expression of a 
contrary view upon that phase of the issues before 
the Court, has approved this determination. Max-
well v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 537; Hamilton v. Reg-
ents, 293 U. S. 245, 261. The power to free defen-
dants in state trials from self-incrimination was 
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specifically determined to be beyond the scope of 
the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U. S. 78, 91-98. 'The privilege against self-incrim-
ination may be withdrawn and the accused put upon 
the stand as a witness for the state.' The Twining 
case likewise disposed of the contention that free-
dom from testimonial compulsion, being specifically 
granted by the Bill of Rights, is a federal privilege 
or immunity that is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against state invasion. This Court held 
that the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of this pro-
tection against the power of the national govern-
ment did not make the privilege a federal privilege 
or immunity secured to citizens by the Constitution 
against state action. Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 
at 98-99; Palko v. Connecticut, supra, at 328 * * * 
We reaffirm the conclusion of the Twining and 
Palko cases that protection against self-incrimina-
tion is not a privilege or immunity of national citi-
zenship. 
"* * * 
"Specifically, the due process clause does not 
protect, by virtue of its mere existence, the ac-
cused's freedom from giving testimony by compul-
sion in state trials that is secured to him against 
federal interference by the Fifth Amendment. 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99-1f4; Palko 
v. Connecticut, supra, p. 323. For a state to require 
testimony from an accused is not necessarily a 
breach of a state's obligation to give a fair trial. 
* * *" 
As a consequence, appellant may not be heard to contend 
that the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution afford her any relief. 9 McCormick, 
Evidence, 1954, page 257. 
State Constitution : Article I, Section 12 of the Con-
stitution of Utah provides: 
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself * * * " 
The clear meaning of this provision would limit the right 
to claim a constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to an accused. This conclusion arises from the fact 
that only the term "accused" is employed rather than the 
word "person" which appears in the Federal Constitution, 
Amendment V, and in sixteen state constitutions, Mc-
Naughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 
Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. & Pol. Sci. 138, 139 (1960). The same 
conclusion follows from the fact that there is no limitation 
on the term evidence, restricting it to incriminating evi-
dence, thus implying that only an "accused" is contem-
plated since he may refuse to even take the stand, .. whereas 
a witness normally may not refuse to be sworn. In Re 
Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P. 2d 213 (1936); McCorm-
ick, Evidence, p. 257-8 (1954). Although the term "against 
himself" may imply simple incrimination, it is broader than 
the word incrimination is normally construed. In In Re 
Sadleir, 97 Utah 291, 85 P. 2d 810 (1938), Mr. Justice 
9ln State V. Byington, 114 Utah 388,200 P. 2d 723 (1948), the court 
seemed to intimate that the Federal Constitution would ·he available to a 
?efendant in a civil trial to refuse to answer an incriminating question. The 
tnference arises from that opinion :by virtue of the cour:t's using the word 
"constitutions'' rather than limiting its dicussion to the Utah Constitution. 
l;'o the e~t~nt that the Byington opinion would apply the Federal constitu-
tional pnV1lege against self-incrimination to state proceedings, it is erron-
eous. 
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Moffat infer:red that the constitutional privilege under Ar-
ticle I, Section 12 was limited to an accused. Thus he noted, 
speaking of a statutory privilege of a witness : 
"The principle behind the statute is declared 
in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, 
where among other things it is stated: 'The ac-
cused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself. This applies as well, before indictment or 
information filed as afterward. In the instant case 
the witness is not the accused. This provision of 
the constitution is. referred to only as it tends to 
form a background affecting the interpretation of 
the statute relating to the duty of witnesses to an-
swer or affirm under oath and the right a witness 
has to claim privilege under the statute." 
Additional support for the conclusion that the constitu-
tional privilege under Article I, Section 12, Constitution 
of Utah, is limited to an accused rather than a witness 
appears in the history of the Constitutional Convention 
from the remarks of the delegates during discussion on 
'the section. See statement of Delegate Evans from Weber 
County, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 
p. 308, where he comments as to what Section 12 gives: 
"* * * all these rights which we vouch to 
the person charged with crime." 
Further, Delegate Thurman, 1 Proceedings of the Con-
stitutional Convention, p. 312: 
"We are speaking here of rights that the ac-
cused party has." 
Although several states appear to have applied the 
privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses as well as 
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an accused, Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2252, Vol. 
VIII, p. 324; (a similar statement is found in the Mc-
Naughton Rev. 1961, p. 326), it does not appear that most 
of the decisions covering such cases have applied constitu-
tional provisions similar to that of Utah. In State v. 
Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853), the Arkansas Supreme Court, 
by implication, construed a provision for the protection of 
an ''accused" to cover a witness as well. Research has not 
disclosed any other cases expressly construing the term 
"accused" as including a witness; however, decisions from 
other states having similar constitutional provisions have 
allowed a witness to invoke a constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination. Paynter Short v. State, 4 Har-
rington's Reports (Dela. 1845) ;1° Cooper v. Keyes, 246 Ky. 
268, 54 S. W. 2d 933; Young v. Knight, 329 S. W. 2d 195 
(Ky. 1959). However, these cases offer little support for 
the construction of the Utah Constitution in a similar man-
ner since they did not directly construe the language of 
the particular constitution and the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution appears to have been purposely selected to 
restrict the constitutional claim to an accused.11 
Although the case of State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 
200 P. 2d 723 (1948) indicated that it has been generally 
recognized that constitutional provisions protect a witness, 
:.oTbe Delaware Supreme Court apparently relied upon a common law right 
of a witness to invoke privilege against self-incrimination rather than upon 
the Delaware Constitution, since the court relied upon English authority 
to sustain the witness's right to invoke the privilege and did not disc.,uss 
at all the particular terms of the Delaware Constitution. 
11Althougb the Federal constitutional privilege bas been construed to be ap-
plicable to w~tn~, Counselman v. Hi~cbcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); 
Batalla V. Drstnct Court, 7 4 Puerto Rtco 2 6 6 {19 53) (construing the 
Organic Act of Puerto Rico), these provisions of the Federal Constitjtltio-n 
vary substantially from those found in Article I, Section 12 of the Con-
stitution of Utah. 
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the court did not thoroughly analyze the Utah Constitution, 
misapplied the Federal Constitution and failed to consider 
the fact that our Legislature has founded the right of a 
witness to refuse to testify on statute rather than upon 
the Constitution. It is submitted, therefore, that the By-
ington case should be limited to its particular facts and the 
court should rule that Article I, Section 12 limits the con-
stitutional privileg.e to the right of an accused to refuse 
to give evidence against himself. 
An additional reason presents itself in the instant case 
as to why the appellant should be foreclosed from relying 
upon the Utah Constitution for her claim of privilege, this 
being that at the time of trial, appellant relied exclusively 
on the statutory claim of right afforded to a witness and 
did not purport to invoke the privilege, if any, which might 
have been afforded by the State Constitution. Consequent-
ly, it is submitted that the appellant should be limited on 
appeal to claiming that her statutory right provided by 
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, was violated. 
Statutory Privilege - 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953: One 
obvious reason why the provisions of Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution were not intended to go beyond 
an accused is found from the fact that the Legislature saw 
fit to enact a statute granting to a "witness" a privilege 
against self-incrimination or degradation. If the Legisla-
ture had thought the Constitution granted such a privilege, 
they would not have enacted the statute. 78-24-9, U. C. A. 
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1958, was enacted in 1951 (Laws of Utah 1951, Ch. 58, 
Sec. 1); however, the same statute was passed, as it is now 
worded, at the time of statehood, R. S. 1898, Sec. 3431. 
Since many of the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion were members of the first Legislature of the State, it 
would be difficult to argue anything but that R. S. 1898, 
Sec. 3431 (78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953) was intended to go be-
yond the provisions of Article I, Section 12, not merely 
restate part of it. 
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"A witness must answer questions lega] and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his an-
swer may establish a claim against himself; but he 
need not give an answer which will have a tendency 
to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor need 
he give an answer which will have a direct ten-
dency to degrade his character, unless it is to the 
very fact in issue or to a fact from which the fact 
in issue would be presumed. But a witness must 
answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of 
felony." 
A clear reading of that statute would seem to limit the 
privilege of a witness to refuse to answer incriminating 
questions to those questions which would lead to the wit-
ness's conviction for a felony as that term is explained 
and definded by 76-1-12 and 13, U. C. A. 1953. In In Re 
Sadleir, 97 Utah 291, 85 P. 2d 810 (1938), two of the Jus-
tices felt the predecessor to the present statute covered 
felonies as well as misdemeanors. Thus, Justices Moffat 
and Larsen construed the word "felony" as including more 
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than the definition of that term within the Code. Justices 
Wolfe and Folland construed the statute as applying to 
felonies and misdemeanors malum in se, but not misde-
meanors, malum prohibitum. Justice Ephraim Hansen, 
who was on the court at the time, did not sit. Subsequent-
ly the case was re-argued with Justices Folland and Han-
sen no longer being members of the court, and Justices 
McDonough and Pratt sitting. Justice Pratt concurred in 
a finding of reversal, but it is not clear whether he con-
curred in the determination that misdemeanors were in-
cluded within the term "felony" as used by the privilege 
statute. Justice McDonough did not concur in that deter-
mination but reserved the question. Justice Wolfe filed a 
new dissenting opinion in which he continued to adhere 
to the position that the word "felony" could not be con-
strued to apply to all misdemeanors. As a consequence, the 
opinion in In Re Sadleir cannot really be said to stand 
for anything by way of precedent. Supporting this con-
clusion is the fact that the Legislature saw fit, although 
some time subsequent, to completely repeal the then stat-
ute, Section 104-49-20, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, and 
re-enact anew the same statute. It is inferable from this 
action that the Legislature felt that the interpretation of 
the statute should be approached from a fresh viewpoint. 
It is submitted that unless the court is to do serious 
injustices to the principle that unambiguous legislative 
enactments are to be interpreted in accordance with the 
clear import of their terms, that 78-24-9 must be construed 
as being limited to felonies, and that misdemeanors are not 
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encompassed within that term. 12 This would construe the 
statute in the obvious manner which the Legislature in-
tended. The term "felony' has been defined in 76-1-13, U. 
C. A. 1953, as being a separate and distinct crime and not 
encompassing misdemeanors. See also 76-12-12, U. C. A. 
19f>~1. Additionally, such a construction is harmonious of 
a common sense application of the privilege against self-
incrimination. An appropriate balance must be drawn be-
tween the needs of law enforcement agencies to protect 
the public and the needs to protect the individual rights of 
an accused. See Wyman, A Common Sense View of the 
Fifth Amendment, 51 Jnl. of Crim. Law, Crim. & Pol. Sci., 
155 (1960); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 
(1955). 
If the court is not inclined to so construe the statute, 
then .the most obvious compromise would be to adopt the 
position urged by Mr. Justice Wolfe that only those mis-
demeanors which are malum in se are so protected. This 
12Counsel contends for the first time on appeal that the answer to the 
question concerning homosexual acts could incriminate the appellant by 
proving, or by tending to subject her to punishment for vio.lating Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 3 2-1-7 covering "indecent and immoral conduct." 
Since this offense would only be a misdemeanor, it would not be within 
the constsruction of 78-24-9, as urged by the Sta·te in this brief. How-
ever, an additional reason exists why 3 2-1-17, Revised Ordinances Salt 
Lake City, 1955, is not applicable. First, this is not malum in se but 
is malum prohibitum. See Anderson V. Commonwealth, 16 Am. Dec. 
776 (Va. 1827): Thompson, Common Law Crimes Against Public 
Morals, 49 Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. and Pol. Sci. 350, 351 (1958). Sec-
ondly. the viola·tion, if any, would have to have been committed within 
Salt !-ake City, and the appellant was a resident of Sah Lake County, and 
notbtng of record would appear to support that appellant would be within ~e geographical jurisdiction that would subject her to punishment, and 
~ce appellant has the burden of proof that such answer would tend to 
lllcriminate her, there would be insufficient evidence of record before this 
court t<? support the appellant's burden. Third, the ordinance is probably 
unconstttuttonal. 
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is also most directly in harmony with the history of the 
self-incrimination clause. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., 
Sec. 2250. 
Meaning of Tending to Incriminate: It is submitted 
that the court should, in the instant appeal, limit itself to 
the consideration of whether the requested answer would 
tend to incriminate as that term is used under 78-24-9. 
However, even were the court to consider that the consti-
tutional question is before it, the standard to be applied as 
to whether or not the answer to a particular question would 
criminate would be the same, and as related to the facts of 
the instant case, the appellant would not be privileged to 
make a claim of self-incrimination. 
It is well settled that a claim of privilege must be more 
than a fanciful or imaginary danger; it must be real and 
relate to a "probability" of prosecution. 4 Jones, Evidence, 
Sec. 861 (1958). McCormick, Evidence, p. 271 (1954), 
comments on the required showing: 
"A classic statement of the test is that 'the 
Court must see, from the circumstances of the case, 
and the nature of the evidence which the witness 
is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to 
apprehend danger to the witness from his being 
compelled to answer. It seems that to meet this 
test the court must find ( 1) that there is substan-
tial probability that the witness has committed a 
crime under the law of the forum, and (2) that the 
fact called for is an essential part of the crime, or 
is a fact which taken with other facts already 
proved, or which may probably be proved, would 
make out a circumstantial case of guilt." 
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See also Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2261. 
In Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 ( 1917), the 
United States Supreme Court noted the general standard 
was expressed : 
"The constitutional protection against self-in-
crimination 'is confined to real danger and does not 
extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary 
course of law.' " 
Further the court noted : 
"The general rule under which the trial judge 
must determine each claim according to its own 
particular circumstances, we think, is indicated with 
adequate certainty in the above cited opinions. Or-
dinarily, he is in much better position to appreciate 
the essential facts than an appellate court can hold 
and he must be permitted to exercise some discre-
tion, fructified by common sense, when dealing 
with this necessarily difficult subject. Unless there 
has been a distinct denial of a right guaranteed, 
we ought not to interfere. 
"In the present case the witnesses certainly 
were not relieved from answering merely because 
they declared that so to do might incriminate them. 
The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illus-
trated by the enforced answer, 'I don't know,' given 
by Mason to the second question, after he had re-
fused to replay under a claim of constitutional priv-
ilege." 
In the instant case, LaRae Peterson had previously 
indicated she did not know if it was possible for two 
women to have any form of sexual relations; obviously, 
after such a disclosure, there was no "real danger" of her 
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being subjected to criminal punishment. The danger, if 
any, was gone, since if she did not know if it was in fact 
possible to have such a relationship, she could not have had 
such a relationship as would subject her to punishment. 
She was obviously raising the objection of self-incrimina-
tion to avoid disclosing non-criminative but otherwise im-
portant evidence, or to frustrate a legitimate inquiry of the 
prosecution. In The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. &S. 311, 121 
Eng. Rep. 730 (1861), it was said as to the privilege: 
"Further than this, we are of opinion that the 
danger to be apprehended must be real and apprec-
iable, with reference to the ordinary operation of 
law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger 
of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, hav-
ing reference to some extraordinary and barely 
possible contingency, so improbable that no reason-
able man would suffer it to influence his conduct. 
We think that a merely remote and naked possi-
bility, out of the ordinary course of the law and 
such as no reasonable man would be affected by, 
should not be suffered to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice. The object of the law is to afford 
to a party, called upon to give evidence in a pro-
ceeding inter alios, protection against being brought 
by means of his own evidence within the penalties 
of the law. But it would be to convert a salutary 
protection into a means of abuse if it were to be 
held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger, 
however remote and improbable, was sufficient to 
justify the withholding of evidence essential to the 
ends of justice." 
The circumstances of the instant case are almost 
squarely within those of the Mas on case referred to above; 
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under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that the 
trial judge, who saw the witnesses and their expressions, 
abused his discretion in finding that there was no real 
danger to appellant from answering the prosecution's 
question. 
Counsel has urged this court to push the concept of 
self-incrimination beyond the rule laid down in Mason and 
beyond the rule that has been generally recognized as be-
ing the standard to be applied in appraising whether or not 
the answer to any question would tend to incriminate. 
Counsel asks this court to adopt the position which he 
acknowledges is the minority position13 espousoed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Hoffman v. United States, 
341 U. S. 479 (1951). This concept will allow a claim of 
the privilege unless it were "perfectly clear" that the an-
swer "cannot possibly" have a tendency to incriminate. 
However, subsequent decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court have not been willing to extend the rule be-
yond the facts in that case, and it appears that the cases 
still require a showing of substantial likelihood of injury. 
McNaughton, supra, 51 Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. & Pol. Sci., p. 
138 (1960). McCormick, Evidence, p. 272 (1954) in this 
regard, notes : 
"* * * Fortunately, state courts which re-
gard this change of view as unwise are free to ad-
13See Wigmoft, Evidence, McNaughton Revision, Sec. 2260; McNaughton 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, its Constitutional Affectation' Ra~r d'Etre a.nd Miscellaneous Implications, 51 Jnl. of Crim. Law: 
Cnm. E1 Pol. Sci., p, 138, 152 (1960). 
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here to the earlier and, it is submitted, more bal-
anced and expedient attitude." 
Indeed, any other rule would do violence to the balancing 
test espoused by Justice Marshall in the case of United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas., 38, 39 (1807) .14 Since no 
reason exists to go beyond the substantiality test which 
appears to have been solidified by previous Utah decisions, 
the court should reject that position. State v. Thorn, 39 
Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58; State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 
64 P. 2d 229. Consequently, applying the rules previously 
noted that there must be a reasonable probability of sub-
stantial punitive injury to the witness, the appellant is in 
no position to complain, since by her testimony prior to 
the invocation of the privilege, she made it clear that she 
could not possibly have engaged in any incriminating act, 
HCounsel has in his brief cited United States V. Burr as standing for the 
proposition that the self-incrimination provision really was intended to 
extend beyon~ the rule that it must appear reaso·nably dear that a substan-
tial injury upon answering would occur to a witness. It should be noted 
that the Burr case was decided by Justice Marshall while acting as a Cir-
cuit Judge and not upon the Supreme Court. McCormick, Evidence p. 270 
(1954) notes that reading the Burr case to stand for the proposition that 
the appellant urges is to erroneously apply the case. He states: "The 
classic statement on the question is that of Marshall, C. J. in Unt"ted State& 
V. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (1807). as follows: "It is the province 
of the court to judge whether any direct answer to the question which may 
be proposed will furnish against the witness. If such answer may disclose 
a fact which forms a necessary and,\ essential link in the chain of testimony 
which would be sufficient to c.onvict him of any crime, he is not bo1und 
to answer it, so as to furnish matter for that conviction. In such a case, 
the witness must himself judge what his answer will be, and if he say, 
on oath, that he cannot answer without accusing himse-lf, he cannot be 
compelled to answer." This is susceptible of an interpretation giving too 
wide a power to the witness, since almost any question "may" conceivably 
in •theoretical possibility call for an answer which will the part of the 
circumstantial proof of a ·crime. It must be qualified by the condition that 
under all the facts the judge must find a substantial probability of danger. 
See the later discussion .in this section. And Marshall's actual holding -that 
a question to a witness as to his present knowledge of the meaning of a 
letter in cipher (charged to be 'treasonable) was not privileged), because 
present knowledge is not sufficient to prove prior knowledge at the time 
of the plot, is consistent with that qualification." 
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including sodomy, as that crime is defined in 76-53-22.1 :; 
Further, the term "homosexual act" has such gigantic 
breadth and so many things are encompassed in the term 
"homosexual" that do not include criminal conduct, that 
there is little likelihood that the answer to the question 
would tend to incriminate the appellant. In Blakiston's 
Medical Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Homosexuality is defined as 
follows: 
"1. The state of being sexually attracted by 
members of one's own sex. 2. The state of being 
in love with one of the same sex. 3. In psychoanaly-
sis, a form of homoerotism in which the interest is 
sexual but sublimated, not receiving genital expres-
sion."16 
Obviously, if homosexual is generally defined as not being 
identified with overt sensuality in women, and if the wit-
ness in the instant case declined any knowledge of the 
1&66-53-22 defines sodomy as the "detestable and abomina,ble crime against 
nature, wrnmitted with mankind or with any animal with either the sexual 
organs or the mouth * * *." No case has detcided in Utah whether 
or not an act by two females can constitu.te sodomy. It wo,uld indeed be 
impossible for two females to c.ommit sodomy in the normal sense of that 
term since neither female could penetrate the other with any sexual organ 
which was actually a part of their body. Some .form of false device 
might be used, but this would) not constitute penetration lby a sexual 
organ. In State V. Petersen, 81 Utah 340, 17 P. 2d 925 (1933). this 
cQurt discussed the amended sodomy statute and ruled that an act of cunni-
lingus between a man and a woman would constitute sodomy. To extend 
the sodomy statute to an attempt at cunnilngus between two women would 
be ,most difficult since there could hardly be any penetration of the female 
sex organ into the mouth of :the other female. Penetration iis the cl-assic 
definition of a sexual crime between two persons in order to constitute 
sodomy. It is clear, therefore, that appellant is endeavoring to unrealistic-
ally extend the criminal law. 
16Recent psychoanalytical studies have indicated th-at overt acts seldom ac-
company female homosexuality. See Lorand, Perversions, Psychodynamics 
Therapy; in this regard Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, 
Vol. 1. page 195, speaking of sexual inversion of women, notes: "* * * 
Like other anomalies, indeed, in its more pronOIUnced forms it may be 
less frequently met with in women; in its less pronounced forms almost 
certainly, it is more frequently found. * * *" ' 
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possibility of such actions, it can hardly be said that there 
is any real and substantial danger that the answer to the 
question as posed, on the basis of the record before the 
court, would tend to incriminate the appellant. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT COULD NOT AVAIL HER-
SELF OF A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE THAT 
THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION MAY 
TEND TO DEGRADE HER SINCE THE QUES-
TION WAS DIRECTLY MATERIAL TO THE 
ISSUE OF MOTIVE IN THE CASE OF STATE 
VS. JEAN SINCLAIR. 
Appellant, as part of her claim for reversal, contends 
that she is entitled to invoke the degrading provision of 
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953. No cases are cited in support of her 
position. The evidence of any homosexual relationship be-
tween the appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, was 
directly relevant to the prosecution's claim of motive. As 
can be seen from the argument of the prosecutor in the 
Jean Sinclair case in summation, the love letter between 
the appellant and Miss Sinclair and the various other close 
relationships between the ladies was contended to allow an 
inference that Miss Sinclair killed the deceased out of jeal-
ousy because the deceased had diverted the affections of 
the appellant from her. The statute which allows a witness 
to claim a privilege against disclosing degrading testimony 
is subject to the exception that if the answer sought would 
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go to the very fact in issue, or to a fact from which the fact 
'in iJJsue would be p'resumed, the witness must answer. 
In the instant case the fact of a jealous homosexual 
relationship between the appellant and the defendant, Jean 
Sinclair, would be a fact from which the ultimate fact of 
the murder could be presumed since it would establish the 
motive for the crime. 
Various authorities have noted the limitations on the 
right of a witness to invoke the privilege against giving 
testimony which would tend to subject the witness to dis-
grace. Thus, McCormick on Evidence, page 269 ( 1954) 
notes: 
uln the early 1700s a privilege was recognized 
against compelling answers, as to matters not ma-
terial to the issues, which would disgrace or de-
grade, though not incriminate, the witness. This 
privilege has become obsolete in England and in 
most of our states, except where statutes have pre-
served the relic. The policy behind this former priv-
ilege is now more appropriately served by rules 
restricting cross-examination as to collateral mis-
conduct of a witness to impeach him, or permitting 
the judge in his discretion to restrict it, and the 
rule forbidding extrinsic proof of such misconduct." 
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2255, notes : 
"The privilege against disclosing facts involv-
ing disgrace or infamy (i.e., irrespective of crim-
inality) began to be recognized later than the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and independently 
of it. Its limitations were entirely distinct, in that 
it did not cover facts merely 'tending' to disclooo 
infamy, and did not apply to facts material to the 
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issues (but only to ;collateral' facts,-practically, 
to facts solely affecting credibility). * * *" 
See also MeN aughton Revision, Sec. 2255. 
The Territorial Supreme Court •early recognized the 
limitation of materiality on the witness's right to refuse to 
disclose degrading information. In Conway v. Clinton, 1 
Utah 215, 220 ( 1875), it was stated: 
"* * * but it is well-settled that a witness 
is not bound to answer, nor a court to compel an-
swer to an inquiry to disgrac-e a witness unless the 
evidence is material to the issue being tried. 
* * *" 
A similar expression of the rule is found in State v. 
Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 (1937). In the 
abortive case of In Re Sadleir, the court, in discussing the 
degradation privilege, notes that it was available to the 
witness in that case17 since the ultimate fact in issue was 
never proved. Justice Wolfe, who concurl'ed initially as 
to that aspect of the court's determination, and Justice 
Moffat made it clear that had the ultimate fact been proved, 
that the witness's answ•er would have been material. 
In the instant case the court is confronted with no 
such problem since the murder of Don Foster was obvi-
ously shown, and the question of identity of the defendant 
was the material issu•e. To afford a witness the right to 
claim a privilege against disclosing degrading information 
17lt should be noted that that case decided nothing as far as precedent is 
concerned. Indeed, Justice Moffat did what Dean Wigmore indicated the 
·courts had been unable to do, to-wit, utterly confuse the degradation privi-
lege with the co·nstitutional privilege against self~incrimination. 
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where such information would be directly relevant to the 
corpus of the crime, or prove such an important aspect of 
the crime as the motiv.e, would be. to place reputation above 
the need for protection of society, something which, in this 
day and age, would be an absurd and ludicrous result. It 
is submitted that the appellant has no basis to invoke the 
degradation provisions of 78-24-9. 
POINT III. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AT 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN THE CASE 
OF STATE VS. JEAN SINCLAIR DEMON-
STRATES THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR 
A CLAIM THAT THE ANSWER SHE WOULD 
GIVE IN RESPONSE TO THE PROSECU-
TION'S QUESTION, FOR WHICH REFUSAL 
TO ANSWER SHE ·WAS HELD IN CON-
TEMPT, WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE 
HER. 
The appellant was called as a witness on behalf of 
the State in the preliminary hearing of the same case, 
State v. Sinclair, in which she was found in contempt at 
trial for refusing to answer a question propounded by the 
prosecution. The testimony of the preliminary hearing is 
a part of the record in the case of State v. Sinclair, No. 
9971. The record of the appellant's testimony given at the 
preliminary hearing makes it manifest that there was no 
substantial fear that her testimony would tend to incrim-
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inate her. In response to a question18 put by the prosecu-
tion, which was, 
uQ. Did you and Jean Sinclair engage in im-
moral oox activities in that motel room on that 
date? 
"A. As far as doing anything immoral, no.'' 
Additionally, 19 in oosponse. to a question as to whether or 
not Miss Sinclair had ever kissed the appellant on her 
breasts, LaRae Peterson testified that she couldn't remem-
ber when. The question was aslved,2° 
"Q. Is it your testimony under oath at this 
time, Miss Peterson, that you cannot tell this Judge 
of any time when this Jean Sinclair caressed and 
kissed your breasts; is that your testimony under 
oath? 
"A. I cannot put a date on it, that is correct.'1 
Additionally, the same record reflects~w that LaRae Peter-
son denied getting in bed with Miss Sinclair and perform-
ing sexual acts. As a consequ.ence, the only indication of 
homosexual acts between Jean Sinclair and the appellant 
is an inference from the appellant's way of answering at 
the time of preliminary hearing that th.ere may have been 
some fondling of the appellant's breasts by the defendant.21 
This, of course, does not constitute sodomy nor violate any 
provision of law, as the record makoes it clear that any re-
lationship that may have transpired, of this very limited 
nature, occurred in the privacy of Miss Peterson's home 
lSR. 9971. page 306. 
19Jbid., 309. 
20Jbid.. 3 1 0. 
21Jbid., 307-310. 
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or residence. Thus, there is no evidence at all before this 
court which would indicate anything other than that there 
was no reasonable fear that the answer to the question 
put by the prosecutor would tend to incriminate. At best, 
the answer could only have tended to embarrass the ap-
pellant, and this provides no basis to claim a privilege 
against self-incrimination, and since the testimony of the 
appellant was directly material to the issue of motive, the 
privilege against degradation was also not applicable. 
The State does not contend at this point that the ap-
pellant has waived any right to claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination by virtue of having testified at the pre-
liminary hearing, since the weight of authority seems to 
be to the contrary. In Re Neff, 206 F. 2d 149, 3rd Circuit 
(1953); 136 A. L. R. 2d 1398. However, the State does 
contend that the evidence offoered at the preliminary hear-
ing depreciates the contention made by the appellant that 
an answer given to the prosecution's question might tend 
to subject her to punishment for a felony or other crime. 22 
This evidence, when coupled with the other evidence at the 
time of trial, negativing the real and substantial possibility 
that the answer to the prosecution's qu-estion would tend 
12Were ~e issue to be presented, the State would contend, in spite of the 
~u~onty to .the contra~, that once an answer has been given at a pre-
lunmary heanng, there 1s no further reason to allow a witness, as distinct 
from an accused, to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination since 
at tha~ point the ad~ission is a matter of record and may be used against 
the Wttness at any tlme. It would, therefore, not protect the witness to 
allow a later invocation of the privilege, but rather, would frustrate the 
prosecution in using evidence material to a particular case even though 
!t co~ld use the same ~vidence having, obtained it at the preliminary hear-
mg. m a later prosecutton against the witness. The State's position is ·that ~ PUfPC?St of the privilege against self-incrimination having vanished the 
pnvilege ttself should not be allowed. 
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to incriminate the witness, warrants this court in affirm-
ing the finding of contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant in this case was at least a friend of the 
defendant. By her own testimony on the witness stand, 
there was no ignomineous relationship between she and 
the defendant, Jean Sinclair, since had there been such a 
relationship, she certainly would have had knowledge as 
to the possibility of commission of sexual acts between 
women. Additionally, the appellant's testimony at prelim-
inary hearing negatives the possibility of criminality, 
which leads to the conclusion that the relationship between 
the appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, although 
unusual and possibly embarrassing to the appellant, was 
not criminal. As a consequence, it is clear that there was 
no ''real danger" that the answer to the prosecution's ques-
tion could have subjected the appellant to crimina.l lia-
bility. 
The appellant, in her brief, has relied primarily upon 
decisions which constitute a minority position or which, in 
the cited decision, have used broad language unsupported 
by the result. The instant case offers a fact situation very 
similar to that before the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917). 
In that case the Supreme Court found that there was no 
reasonable basis upon which the self-incrimination privi-
leg.e could be invoked. The wisdom of that decision is ap-
plicable to the instant case, and the trial court, who had 
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full opportunity to measure the sincerity of the witness, 
facial expressions, and the extent to which the witness 
pressed the privilege rather than collateral counsel, should 
be sustained. 
Further, the appellant's argument that somehow the 
answer to the question involved might subject her to pun-
ishment for the crime of sodomy is more hypothoetical than 
real. It is obvious that the protection claimed in the instant 
case was not claimed in good faith. Consequently the privi-
lege was not available. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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